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Abstract
It is typical to assume that there is no conflict of interest among leaders. Under such as-
sumption, it is known that, for a multi-agent system with two leaders, if the followers’
interaction subgraph is undirected and connected, then followers will converge to a convex
combination of two leaders’ states with linear consensus protocol. In this paper, we intro-
duce the conflict between leaders: by choosing k followers to connect with, every leader
attempts all followers converge to himself closer than that of the other. By using graph
theory and matrix theory, we formulate this conflict as a standard two-player zero-sum
game and give some properties about it. It is noteworthy that the interaction graph here is
generated from the conflict between leaders. Interestingly, we find that to find the optimal
topology of the system is equivalent to solve a Nash equilibrium. Especially for the case of
choosing one connected follower, the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction
graph to be the optimal one is given. Moreover, if followers’ interaction graph is a circu-
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lant graph or a graph with a center node, then the system’s optimal topology is obtained.
Simulation examples are provided to validate the effectiveness of the theoretical results.
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1 Introduction
A multi-agent system is composed of multiple autonomous agents which can ex-
change information and mutually interact. In recent years, distributed control of
multi-agent systems(MASs) have attracted intensive attention in the scientific com-
munity. This is due to its diverse applications in many areas, such as formation con-
trol in unmanned aerial vehicles[1,2], flocking in biology [3], coverage control of
sensor networks [4], attitude alignment of satellite clusters [5], and so on.
1.1 Related works
Consensus seeking is a basic problem of MASs which aims to design appropri-
ate distributed protocols or algorithms such that a group of agents can converge
to the same state. It was originally studied by Vicsek et al. [6] and was theoreti-
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Nos. 61020106005, 61375120 and 61304160) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the
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cally explained by graph theory in [7]. Olfati-Saber and Murray developed a sys-
tematical framework of consensus problem in networks of dynamic agents with
switching topology and time-delays in [8]. Some relaxed conditions were obtained
for first-order MASs in [9], where consensus is solved if there exists a spanning
tree. Following [7,8,9], there have been extensive studies and results under vari-
ous circumstances, to name but a few, second-order consensus [10], consensus of
heterogeneous MASs [11,12] and finite-time consensus [13,14], etc.
As a special role in MASs, leaders are ubiquitous in nature, for instance, the navi-
gation aircraft in a fight formation of UAVs and the leading whale in a whale pop-
ulation. This fact attracts researchers’ great attention and leads to some research
hotspots such that leader-following consensus [15,16], containment control prob-
lem [20,22] and controllability analysis [24,25,26]. For a multi-agent system with
a single leader, followers will converge to the state of leader, which is called the
tracking control or leader-following consensus problem. Sufficient conditions for
solving leader-following consensus were brought up for MASs [15,16]. Based on
linear quadratic regular theory, Ma et al. proved that the optimal topology of leader-
following consensus is a star graph [17]. As an extension of leader-following con-
sensus, containment control problem of MASs with multiple leaders means that the
states of the follower will converge to the convex hull spanned by the leaders. In
[18], the authors assumed the leaders located in vertices of a convex polytope, and
presented a hybrid Stop-Go strategy for first-order leaders with the fixed undirected
topology. Notarstefano et al. investigated containment control of first-order MASs
with switching topologies [19]. Liu et al. obtained the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for solving containment control of multi-agent systems with multiple sta-
tionary and dynamic leaders under directed networks in [20]. Some research topics
of containment control under different systems have also been addressed, such as
3
containment control for second-order MASs [21], for heterogeneous MASs [22]
and for MASs with measurement noises [23].
In a multi-agent system, each agent is an individual who exchanges information
with their neighbors and then makes decision independently. If we further define
the utility of agents and assume that individuals adjust its behaviors by promot-
ing utility, game theory can be introduced to distributed multi-agent coordination.
By reviewing consensus seeking as a non-cooperative differential game, Bauso et
al.[27] proposed a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mech-
anism design problems. By imposing individual objectives, the author proved that
such objectives can be designed so that rational agents have a unique optimal pro-
tocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value. In [2],
the author investigated formation control via a linear-quadratic (LQ) Nash differ-
ential game and gave a RHC-based approach. While as in [28], cooperative game
theory is utilized to ensure team cooperation by considering a combination of in-
dividual cost as the team cost and the Nash-bargaining solution is obtained. For
leader-following MASs, the notion of graphical game was formulated in [29]. The
author brought together cooperative control, reinforcement learning, and game the-
ory to solve multi-player differential games on communication graph topologies
and proposed a cooperative policy iteration algorithm for graphical games that con-
verges to the best response. Gharesifard and Corte´s introduced the distributed con-
vergence to Nash equilibrium for two networks engaged in a strategic scenario in
[30].
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1.2 Our results
Different from the aforementioned literatures, we propose a multi-agent system
with two leaders and formulate a type of game. For a multi-agent system with two
leaders, if the followers’ interaction subgraph GF is undirected and connected, then
each follower will converge to a convex combination of two leaders’ states [20].
Based on this result, we assume that every leader can independently select k (≥ 1)
followers to connect with him. Then, we define the average distance to the followers
as the payoff function of each leader. There is a conflict of interest between two
leaders – what one gains incurs a loss to the other. Therefore, we can describe
this process as a noncooperative game in which each leader independently chooses
an optimal strategy (i.e., the connected followers) to minimize his payoff function.
Noticing that two leaders’ decisions will determine the interaction topologies of the
system, a Nash equilibrium point corresponds to an optimal topology of the system.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we formulate a new type
of game for multi-agent system. Secondly, by utilizing containment control and
matrix theory, we reformulate the game as a zero-sum game denoted by Gk(GF)
and develop some properties based on game theory. Finally, for the case k = 1,
the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be the optimal
topology is given. Moreover, if GF is a circulant graph or a graph with a center node,
then the optimal topology is obtained. It should be mentioned that these results
offer some theoretical explanations to some commercial and political phenomena.
Consider two companies selling similar product or two candidates promoting an
election, both of two opponents aim to propagate their opinion in social networks
by choosing some members as their supporters from it. In the scenario where the
influence power of every member is equal, everyone is the optimal strategy for two
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opponents. If a social network exists a ’center’ member who can influence all the
others, then both of two opponents will select this member to maximize their own
influence.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the graph theory
and two-person zero-sum game and propose our problem. In Section 3, we give
our main results. And in Section 4, numerical simulations are given to illustrate the
effectiveness of the theoretical results. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Notation: Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used: let R be
the set of real numbers. Rn×m is the set of n × m real matrices. Denote by 1n (or
0n) the column vector with all entries equal to one (or all zeros). In denotes an
n−dimensional identity matrix. For a column vector b = [b1, b2, . . . , bn]T , diag{b}
is a diagonal matrix with bi, i = 1, ..., n, on its diagonal and ‖ b ‖1=
∑n
i=1 |bi|
is 1-norm of b. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, adj A and det A are the adjugate and the
determinant of A, respectively. Denote A(i, j) as the matrix obtained by deleting
row i and column j from A and A[i1 ,i2,...,ik] be the k × k principal submatrix of A
by keeping rows and columns i1, i2, ..., ik. In = {1, . . . , n} is an index set. |S | is
the cardinality of a set S . For two sets S 1 and S 2, denote S 1 × S 2 as the Cartesian
product and S 1 \ S 2 = S 1 − S 2. Let ei = [e1, e2, . . . , en]T is the unit column vector
with ei = 1 and e j = 0, j , i. The notation A ⇔ B means that A holds on if and
only if B holds on.
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2 Preliminary
2.1 Graph Theory
In this subsection, we present some basic notions of algebraic graph which will be
used in this paper.
Let G = {V, E} be an undirected graph consisting of a vertex set V = {1, 2, ..., n} and
an edge set E = {(i, j) ∈ V ×V}. If (i, j) ∈ E, then we say that i and j are adjacent or
that j is a neighbor of i. For a subset of V , denoted by W, a graph GW = {W, E(W)}
is an induced subgraph of G if two vertices of W are adjacent in GW if and only
if they are adjacent in G. The adjacency matrix A of G is a symmetric 01-matrix
such that for all i ∈ In, aii = 0 and for all i , j, (i, j) ∈ E ⇔ ai j = a ji = 1, while
ai j = 0 otherwise. The neighbor set of the vertex i is Ni = { j : (i, j) ∈ E}. The
degree matrix D ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix with di =
∑
j∈Ni ai j and the Laplacian
matrix L = D − A. A vertex i is a center node if it connects all the other vertexes,
i.e., Ni = V \{i}. A graph is called a star graph if there exists a center vertex denoted
as ic, and for all j ∈ V \ {ic}, N j = {ic}. A complete graph means that every pair
of vertices are adjacent. A graph is circulant if the adjacency matrix is a circulant
matrix. It is obviously that a complete graph is circulant.
Lemma 1 [32] For a graph G, det L = 0 and adj L = τ(G)1n1Tn , where τ(G) is the
number of spanning trees in the graph G.
Lemma 2 If a graph G is connected, then every principal submatrix of L is positive
definite and moreover, the inverse matrix of it is a nonnegative matrix.
Proof. Denote W = {i1, i2, ..., ik} be a subset of V , and GW = {W, E(W)} be the
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induced subgraph of G where 1 ≤ i1 < i2, ... < ik ≤ n. Then it follows that the adja-
cent matrix of GW , denoted by AW , is the principal submatrix of A by retaining rows
and columns i1, i2, ..., ik. Let LW be the Laplacian matrix of GW , θim = −
∑
j∈W lim j,
m = 1, 2, ..., k. Thus we have L[i1 ,i2,...,ik] = LW + diag{θi1 , ..., θik}. Therefore, from
Lemma 4 in [16], we obtain that L[i1 ,i2,...,ik] is positive definite. Moreover, we have
L[i1 ,i2,...,ik] = diag{li1i1 , ..., likik } − AW = η
(
In − (∆ + AW
η
)
)
where η = max1≤m≤k limim and ∆ = 1η diag{η − li1i1 , ..., η − likik }. Hence, it follows that
L−1[i1 ,i2,...,ik] =
1
η
∞∑
k=0
(
∆ +
AW
η
)k
.
Because ∆ and AW
η
are nonnegative matrices, L−1[i1 ,i2,...,ik] is a nonnegative matrix. 
2.2 Two-person zero-sum games
In this subsection, we present the notions of a class of two-player zero-sum games
where each player has a finite number of strategies to choose from. For more details,
please refer to [31].
Consider a zero-sum game of two players, to be referred to as player P1 and player
P2, in which each player has finite alternatives. Denote the set of strategies of P1 and
P2 as S 1 = {s1, s2, ..., sm} and S 2 = {sˆ1, sˆ2, ..., sˆn}, respectively. A pair of strategies
(si, sˆ j) ∈ S 1 × S 2 means that P1 chooses the strategy si and P2 chooses the strategy
sˆ j. For strategies pair (si, sˆ j), the payoff of P1 is −ai j while that of P2 is ai j. Then,
A = {ai j}m×n is called the outcome of the game and this type of two-person zero-
sum game is called a matrix game A. In a matrix game A, P1 wants to minimize
the outcome of the game, while P2 seeks to maximize it, by independent decisions.
8
Under such an incentive, P1 is forced to pick a strategy si∗ satisfied
V(A) , max
j
ai∗ j = min
i
max
j
ai j.
The strategy si∗ is called a security strategy for P1. Similarly, P2 will choose a
security strategy sˆ j∗ determined by
V(A) , min
i
ai j∗ = maxj
min
i
ai j.
Denote S ∗1 and S ∗2 be the set of the security strategies of P1 and P2, respectively.
Lemma 3 [31] In every matrix game A = {ai j},
(1) V(A) and V(A) are unique,
(2) there exists at least one security strategy for each player,
(3) V(A) ≤ V(A).
Definition 1 [31] For a given (m × n) matrix game A = {ai j}, if a strategies pair
(si∗ , sˆ j∗) satisfied ai∗ j ≤ ai∗ j∗ ≤ ai j∗ for all i ∈ Im and j ∈ In, then it is said that the
matrix game has a Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies. The corresponding
outcome ai∗ j∗ of the game is called the Nash equilibrium outcome denoted by V(A).
Lemma 4 [31] Let A = {ai j} denote an (m × n) matrix game with V(A) = V(A).
Then,
(1) A has a (pure) Nash equilibrium point,
(2) the strategies pair (si, sˆ j) is a Nash equilibrium point for A if and only if si ∈
S ∗1 and sˆ j ∈ S ∗2.
(3) V(A) is uniquely given by V(A) = V(A).
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2.3 Problem statement
Consider a multi-agent system consisting of n followers and two leaders. The set of
the followers is denoted as V = {1, . . . , n}, and the two leaders are denoted as l0 and
l1. The interaction of the followers is described by an undirected graph GF = (V, E).
The following assumption is given throughout this paper.
Assumption 1 (Connectivity) GF is connected.
The leaders l0 and l1 keep static states denoted by y0, y1 ∈ R, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume y0 < y1. The state of follower i ∈ V is denoted as
xi(t) ∈ R. The dynamics of xi(t) is given by
x˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
(x j − xi) + bi(y0 − xi) + di(y1 − xi) (1)
where Ni represents the neighbor set of i in GF and
bi =

1, i f i is connected to l0
0, otherwise
and di =

1, i f i is connected to l1
0, otherwise
denote whether the follower i is connected to the leader l0 and l1 or not, respectively.
Denote b = [b1, . . . , bn]T , d = [d1, . . . , dn]T and X f (t) = [x1(t), . . . , xn(t)]T , then it
follows that
˙X f (t) = −(L + diag{b + d})X f (t) + by0 + dy1 (2)
where L is the Laplacian matrix of GF. Form [20], we have
Lemma 5 If each leader has connected one agent at least in GF (i.e., b , 0n and
d , 0n), then X f (t) will converge to
lim
t→∞
X f (t) = αy0 + βy1
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where
α = [α1, α2, ..., αn]T = (L + diag{b + d})−1b,
β = [β1, β2, ..., βn]T = (L + diag{b + d})−1d,
(3)
αi + βi = 1, αi > 0 and βi > 0 for all i ∈ V.
In this paper, we consider the following game regarding the multi-agent system
(2)(see Fig. 1):
1
2
k
Leader l
1
 
GF
1
2
k
Leader l
0
Fig. 1. An interaction graph ˜G(si, s j) determined by the strategies pair (si, s j)
Players Let l0 and l1 be two players.
Strategies Each player can select k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) followers from V to connected
with, i.e., the set of strategies of each player is S = {s j = (a1, a2, ..., an)T | ai ∈
{0, 1},
∑n
i=1 ai = k}. Obviously, S is a finite set and |S | = Ckn , N. Then, let
S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}.
Payoff The goal of each player is to steer all followers to move forward to himself
as closely as possible. As a result, the payoff of each leader can be described as
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the average distance between the followers and himself. Define
U0(si, s j) = 1
n
n∑
m=1
| lim
t→∞
xm(t) − y0 |,
U1(si, s j) = 1
n
n∑
m=1
| lim
t→∞
xm(t) − y1 |,
as the payoff function of l0 and l1, respectively. Then every player wants to
chooses a strategy from S to minimize his payoff.
According to Lemma 5, we find
U0(si, s j) = 1
n
n∑
k=1
βk(y1 − y0), U1(si, s j) = 1
n
n∑
k=1
αk(y1 − y0) (4)
and
U0(si, s j) + U1(si, s j) = y1 − y0 (5)
for all (si, s j) ∈ S × S . Since y1 − y0 is a constant, there is a conflict of inter-
est between two leaders – what one leader gains incurs a loss to the other leader.
Therefore, this game is noncooperative.
Remark 1 It should be mentioned that this game implies that each leader indepen-
dently selects his own edges to minimize his payoff. Then, for system (2), the two
leaders’ choices (si, s j) determine its interaction graph which consists of follower
interaction graph GF, two leader vertexes l0 and l1 and 2k directed edges from the
leaders to the followers (see Fig. 1). Denoted this graph as ˜G(si, s j). If a strategies
pair (si∗ , s j∗) minimizes both two leader’s payoff functions, then the corresponding
interaction graph ˜G(si∗ , s j∗) is called the optimal topology of the system (2).
Remark 2 This game is common in real world, especially in human society. Con-
sider an example from commercial world. Two companies sell similar products in
a market. A consumer will select the company whose product is ’closer’ to him
in taste or fashion. And each company will select some spokesmen to promote his
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product. The spokesman usually will exert great influence on the consumer in his
decision making. Suppose Cristiano Ronaldo is the spokesman of Nike, then it is
more likely that his fans will choose Nike because of him. The product is thus closer
to him due to the successful marketing strategy. Election issue can also be modeled
by this game. Consider two candidates run for election. A voter will vote the candi-
date closer to him in opinion. Assume the dynamics of voter’s opinion is determined
by his neighbors in social networks. Then, aiming to win the election, each candi-
date seeks to find some loyal supporters to broadcast his politics opinion.
3 Main results
In this section, we will first reformulate the above game and give some properties
about it. Then the case of k = 1 will be investigated further, and the necessary
and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be an optimal topology will be
gotten. Moreover, the optimal topologies of some special cases will be solved.
3.1 Probelm reformulation
It follows from (3) and (5) that
min
si∈S
U0(si, s j) = (y1 − y0) min
si∈S
n∑
k=1
βk
n
,
min
s j∈S
U1(si, s j) = (y1 − y0)
1 − max
s j∈S
n∑
k=1
βk
n

and
n∑
k=1
βk
n
=
1
n
1Tn (L + diag{si + s j})−1s j. (6)
Therefore, l0 attempts to minimize
∑n
k=1
βk
n
, while l1 intends to maximize it, by
independent decisions. Then we can formulate this game as a two-person zero-sum
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game. From (6), it is noticed that ∑nk=1 βkn is independent of the initial states of the
followers and the leaders and is only determined by the structure of GF and the
strategies pair (si, s j). Then we can redefine the game as following:
Definition 2 For a connected graph GF , there are two players, l0 and l1, and an
N × N matrix U = {ui j}N×N = { 1n1
T
n (L + diag{si + s j})−1s j}, si, s j ∈ S . The player l0
wants to pick a strategy si ∈ S satisfied
min
si∈S
max
s j∈S
ui j,
and the player l1 seeks to choose a strategy s j ∈ S such that
max
s j∈S
min
si∈S
ui j.
Then this matrix game is denoted as Gk(GF) and U is the outcome matrix.
Definition 3 For the game Gk(GF), if a strategies pair (si∗ , s j∗) is a Nash equilib-
rium point, i.e., ui∗ j ≤ ui∗ j∗ ≤ ui j∗ , then the interaction graph ˜G(si∗ , s j∗) is optimal
for l0 as well as for l1. We say that ˜G(si∗ , s j∗) is the optimal topology of the system
(2).
In the subsequent development, some properties of the game Gk(GF) will be inves-
tigated.
Property 1 For the strategies pair (si, s j), one has U0(si, s j) = ui j(y1 − y0) and
U1(si, s j) = (1− ui j)(y1 − y0). Moreover, ui j < (= or >) 12 if and only if U0(si, s j) <
(= or >) U1(si, s j).
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the definition of U and (4). 
Property 2 U +UT = 1TN1N , i.e., ui j+u ji = 1 for all i, j ∈ IN . Moreover, V(U) ≥ 12
and V(U) ≤ 12 .
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Proof. According to Lemma 5, one has (L + diag{si + s j})−1(si + s j) = 1n. Then it
follows that
ui j + u ji =
1
n
1Tn (L + diag{si + s j})−1(si + s j) =
1
n
1Tn 1n = 1.
Then we get uii = 12 for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Hence, V(U) = mini max j ai j ≥ 12 and
V(U) = max j mini ai j ≤ 12 . 
Remark 3 If there is a strategy si∗ such that ui∗ j ≤ 12 for all j ∈ V, then V(U) =
V(U) = 12 .
Property 3 Let S ∗0 and S ∗1 be the security strategies set of l0 and l1, respectively.
Then S ∗0 = S ∗1 = S ∗. Moreover, if V(U) = 12 , then (si, s j) is a Nash equilibrium point
if and only if (si, s j) ∈ S ∗ × S ∗, and the Nash equilibrium outcome is 12 .
Proof. If si∗ ∈ S ∗0, then
max
j
ui∗ j = V(U) ≤ maxj ui j.
On the other hand, from Property 2, we have
max
j
ui j = maxj
(1 − u ji) = 1 − minj u ji
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Therefore,
V(U) = min
j
u ji∗ ≥ minj u ji.
That is to say si∗ ∈ S ∗1 and V(U) = 1 − V(U). Similarly, if si∗ ∈ S ∗1, then si∗ ∈ S ∗0.
Therefore, S ∗0 = S ∗1 = S ∗. If V(U) = 12 , then V(U) = 12 . From Lemma 4, we can
make a conclusion that (si, s j) is a Nash equilibium point if and only if (si, s j) ∈
S ∗ × S ∗ and the Nash equilibrium outcome is 12 . 
Remark 4 From Property 3, if (si1 , s j1) and (si2 , s j2) are Nash equilibrium points,
then (si, s j) is a Nash equilibrium for all i, j ∈ {i1, i2, j1, j2}. Hence, in the case
15
of multiple Nash equilibrium points, each player does not have to know which se-
curity strategy his opponent will use in the game, since all such strategies are in
equilibrium and they yield the same value. Therefore, it is not necessary to solve all
Nash equilibrium points. As a result, the aim of each player is to seek a strategy si∗
satisfied ui∗ j ≤ 12 for all j ∈ V.
Property 4 If the two players l0 and l1 pick the same strategy, then all followers
converge to y0+y12 .
Proof. For the strategies pair (si, si), it follows from (3) that
α = β = (L + diag{si + si})−1si.
Because of α+β = 1n, we have α = β = 121n. Hence, from Lemma 5, we can obtain
that all followers converge to y0+y12 . 
Remark 5 From Property 3 and 4, it is obviously that if Gk(GF) has a unique Nash
equilibrium point, then l0 and l1 have a unique security strategy si∗ . Consequently,
all followers will achieve consensus.
3.2 Special case: k = 1
In this subsection we discuss the case of k = 1 which means each player can connect
only with one follower in GF . Denote the game as G1(GF). Then the two players
have n alternatives and the strategies set can be denoted as S = {e1, e2, ..., en}. In or-
der to find the optimal topology, we know from above Properties that it is necessary
to determine whether the inequalities ui j ≤ 12 holds or not, instead of to compute
the precise value of ui j. Then we have the following result:
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Theorem 1 For the game G1(GF), we have ui j < (= or >) 12 if and only if
‖ (L + diag{ei})−1e j ‖1< (= or >) ‖ (L + diag{e j})−1ei ‖1 . (7)
Proof. From Property 1, we have ui j < 12 ⇔ U0(si, s j) < U1(si, s j). According to
(3) and (4), we get
U0(si, s j) < U1(si, s j) ⇔ 1Tn (L + diag{ei + e j})−1e j < 1Tn (L + diag{ei + e j})−1ei.
It follows from (L + diag{ei + e j})−1 =
adj(L + diag{ei + e j})
det(L + diag{ei + e j}) that
1Tn (L + diag{ei + e j})−1e j < 1Tn (L + diag{ei + e j})−1ei
⇔
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei + e j})e j < 1Tn adj(L + diag{ei + e j})ei.
Noticing that
adj(L + diag{ei + e j})e j = adj(L + diag{ei})e j (8)
and
adj(L + diag{ei + e j})ei = adj(L + diag{e j})ei, (9)
one has
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei + e j})e j < 1Tn adj(L + diag{ei + e j})ei
⇔
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j < 1Tn adj(L + diag{e j})ei.
By using Laplace expansion along column k, it follows from Lemma 1 that
det(L + diag{ei}) =
n∑
k=1
(−1)i+klki det L(k, i) + det L(i, i)
= det L + eTi adj L ei = τ(GF)
(10)
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where lki is the kith entry of L. Likewise, we also have det(L + diag{e j}) = τ(GF).
Thus, we obtain
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j < 1Tn adj(L + diag{e j})ei
⇔
1Tn (L + diag{ei})−1e j < 1Tn (L + diag{e j})−1ei.
Denote Li =

1 −eTi
−ei L + diag{ei}

. Due to GF is connected, Li is also the Laplacian
matrix of a connected graph by adding a vertex 0 and an edge (0, i) to GF. Therefore,
it follows from Lemma 2 that (L + diag{ei})−1 is a nonnegative matrix. Likewise,
(L + diag{e j})−1 is a nonnegative matrix too. Then, we get
1Tn (L + diag{ei})−1e j =‖ (L + diag{ei})−1e j ‖1
and
1Tn (L + diag{e j})−1ei =‖ (L + diag{e j})−1ei ‖1 .
Thus, we can make a conclusion that
ui j <
1
2
⇔‖ (L + diag{ei})−1e j ‖1<‖ (L + diag{e j})−1ei ‖1 .
Similarly, we can proof the case of ”=” and ”>”. 
Based on this result, we can decide whether an interaction graph ˜G(ei, e j) is the
optimal topology or not. The following result is obtained:
Theorem 2 For the game G1(GF), let
S e = {ei∗ | ei∗ ∈ S , ‖ (L + diag{ei∗})−1ek ‖1≤‖ (L + diag{ek})−1ei∗ ‖1, k ∈ In}.
Then ˜G(ei∗ , e j∗) is the optimal topology if and only if ei∗ ∈ S e and e j∗ ∈ S e.
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Proof. Because of Definition 3, it is suffice to prove that (ei∗ , e j∗) is a Nash equili-
bium point if and only if ei∗ ∈ S e and e j∗ ∈ S e. It follows from Theorem 1 that
ei∗ ∈ S e ⇔ ui∗k ≤
1
2
, k ∈ In. (11)
Sufficiency. Due to (11), we have maxk ui∗k = maxk u j∗k = 12 . Then, it follows from
Property 2 that V(U) = 12 and moreover, ei∗ and e j∗ are security strategies. Hence,
from Property 3, we have (ei∗ , e j∗) is a Nash equilibrium point.
Necessity. Firstly, we will prove ui∗ j∗ = 12 by contradiction. Since (ei∗ , e j∗) is a Nash
equilibrium point, one has ui∗ j ≤ ui∗ j∗ ≤ ui j∗ for all i, j ∈ In. Suppose ui∗ j∗ > 12 .
Recalling u j∗ j∗ = 12 , we get ui∗ j∗ > u j∗ j∗ which conflicts with the fact that ui∗ j∗ ≤ ui j∗ .
Supposing ui∗ j∗ < 12 , we have ui∗i∗ > ui j∗ which has a conflict with ui∗ j ≤ ui∗ j∗ .
Therefore, we have proved ui∗ j∗ = 12 . Then it follows that ui∗ j ≤
1
2 ≤ ui j∗ for all
i, j ∈ In. According (11), we have ei∗ ∈ S e. Since ui j∗ = 1− u j∗i, we obtain u j∗i ≤ 12 .
Hence, e j∗ ∈ S e. 
For the game G1(GF), we have an interesting property as follows:
Property 5 For every strategies pair (ei, e j) ∈ S × S of G1(GF), we always have
lim
t→∞
(xi(t) − y0) = lim
t→∞
(y1 − x j(t))
Proof. For the case of i = j, it follows from Property 4 that limt→∞(xi(t) − y0) =
limt→∞(y1 − x j(t)) = y1−y02 .
For the case of i , j, one can renumber nodes of GF by exchanging the number of
1 and i and that of 2 and j, i.e., 1 ↔ i, 2 ↔ j. Then, it follows that the the new
Laplacian matrix L′ = PLPT where
P = [ei, e j, ...ei−1, e1, ei+1, ..., e j−1, e2, e j+1, ..., en]
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is orthogonal. It is easy to prove that
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j = 1Tn adj(L′ + diag{e1})e2,
and
1Tn adj(L + diag{e j})ei = 1Tn adj(L′ + diag{e2})e1.
Consequently, it suffices to prove the theorem in the case of i = 1 and j = 2.
Let ˜L1 = L + diag{e1} and ˜L2 = L + diag{e2}, it follows that
˜L1 = ˜L2 + diag{1,−1, 0, ..., 0}.
Denote ˜L−11 = (p1, p2, ..., pn) and ˜L−12 = (r1, r2, ..., rn) where pi, ri are n-dimension
vectors. Thus, it is easy to find that
˜L1 ˜L−12 = In + (r1,−r2, 0n, ..., 0n)T ,
˜L2 ˜L−11 = ( ˜L1 ˜L−12 )−1 = In + (−p1, p2, 0n, ..., 0n)T ,
and p1 = r2 = 1n. Consequently, ˜L1 ˜L−12 and ˜L2 ˜L−11 have eigenvalues λ1, λ2, 1, ..., 1
and λ−11 , λ−12 , 1, ..., 1, respectively. Noticing from (10) that
λ1λ2 =| ˜L1 ˜L−12 |=| ˜L1 || ˜L2 |
−1= 1,
we have λ2 = λ−11 . Then the eigenvalues of ˜L2 ˜L−11 are same as those of ˜L1 ˜L−12 .
Letting p2 = (w1,w2, ...,wn)T and r1 = (z1, z2, .., zn), we obtain
∣∣∣λIn − ˜L2 ˜L−11 ∣∣∣ = (λ − 1)n−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λ 1
−w1 λ − w2 − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (λ − 1)n−2(λ2 − (w2 + 1)λ + w1)
and
∣∣∣λIn − ˜L1 ˜L−12 ∣∣∣ = (λ − 1)n−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λ − z1 − 1 − z2
1 λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (λ − 1)n−2(λ2 − (z1 + 1)λ + z2).
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Thus one has w1 = z2 = 1 and w2 = z1 = λ1 + λ−11 . From Lemma 5, recalling (8),
(9) and (10) we get
lim
t→∞
X f (t) = (L + diag{e1 + e2})−1(e1, e2)(y0, y1)T
=
τ(GF)
|L + diag{e1 + e2}|
[
˜L−12 e1, ˜L
−1
1 e2
]
(y0, y1)T
=
τ(GF)
|L + diag{e1 + e2}|
[r1, p2](y0, y1)T .
Denote µ =
τ(GF)
|L + diag{e1 + e2}|
. It follows that
lim
t→∞
x1(t) = µy0 + µ(λ1 + λ−11 )y1 and limt→∞ x2(t) = µ(λ1 + λ
−1
1 )y0 + µy1.
Since µ + µ(λ1 + λ−11 ) = 1, it is easy to prove
lim
t→∞
(xi(t) − y0) = lim
t→∞
(y1 − x j(t)). 
3.3 Graphical results
In this subsection we will deduce some graphical results for G1(GF). Firstly, we
present the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 For all i , j, we have
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j = nτ(GF) + M(i j) (12)
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where
M(i j) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l11 · · · l1,i−1 l1,i+1 · · · l1 j · · · l1n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
li−1,1 · · · li−1,i−1 li−1,i+1 · · · li−1, j · · · li−1,n
li+1,1 · · · li+1,i−1 li+1,i+1 · · · li+1, j · · · li+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
l j−1,1 · · · l j−1,i−1 l j−1,i+1 · · · l j−1, j · · · l j−1,n
1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 · · · 1
l j+1,1 · · · l j+1,i−1 l j+1,i+1 · · · l j+1, j · · · l j+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
ln1 · · · ln,i−1 ln,i+1 · · · ln j · · · lnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Proof. Firstly, we will prove the case of i < j. Denote ˜L = L + diag{ei} and ∆i =
diag{ei}. Then we have
det ˜L( j, k) = det (L( j, k) + ∆i( j, k)) = det L( j, k) + M jk (13)
where M ji = 0 and
M jk =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l11 · · · l1i . . . l1,k−1 l1,k+1 · · · l1n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
li−1,1 · · · li−1,i · · · li−1,k−1 li−1,k+1 · · · li−1,n
0 · · · 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
li+1,1 · · · li+1,i · · · li+1,k−1 li+1,k+1 · · · li+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
l j−1,1 · · · l j−1,i · · · l j−1,k−1 l j−1,k+1 · · · l j−1,n
l j+1,1 · · · l j+1,i · · · l j+1,k−1 l j+1,k+1 · · · l j+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
ln1 · · · lni · · · ln,k−1 ln,k+1 · · · lnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
for all k , i. It follows that
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j =
n∑
k=1
(−1)k+ j det ˜L( j, k) = nτ(GF) +
n∑
k=1
(−1)k+ j M jk.
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It is easy to prove that
n∑
k=1
(−1)k+ j M jk =
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l11 · · · l1,i−1 l1,i+1 . . . l1,k l1,k+1 · · · l1n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
li−1,1 · · · li−1,i−1 li−1,i+1 · · · li−1,k li−1,k+1 · · · li−1,n
li+1,1 · · · li+1,i−1 li+1,i+1 · · · li+1,k li+1,k+1 · · · li+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
l j−1,1 · · · l j−1,i−1 l j−1,i+1 · · · l j−1,k l j−1,k+1 · · · l j−1,n
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
l j+1,1 · · · l j+1,i−1 l j+1,i+1 · · · l j+1,k l j+1,k+1 · · · l j+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
ln1 · · · ln,i−1 ln,i+1 · · · ln,k ln,k+1 · · · lnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= M(i j)
Hence, we obtain
1Tn adj(L + diag{ei})e j = nτ(GF) + M(i j).
Similarly, we can prove the case of i > j. 
Now we will give some graphical results for the game G1(GF):
Theorem 3 For two nodes i, j ∈ V, if Ni\{ j} ⊇ N j \ {i}, then ui j ≤ 12 and the
equality holds if and only if Ni \ { j} = N j \ {i}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Property 5, it suffices to prove the theorem in the case
of i = 1 and j = 2.
It follows from (7) and (12) that u12 ≤ 12 if and only if det M(21) − det M(12) ≥ 0.
Since (12), we have
det M(21) − det M(12) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 · · · 1
l31 − l32 l33 · · · l3n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
l31 − ln2 ln3 · · · lnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
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If N1\{2} = N2 \ {1}, then l j1 − l j2 = 0, j ∈ {3, 4, ..., n}. It follows that det M(21) −
det M(12) = 0. Hence u12 = 12 .
IfN1\{2} ⊃ N2\{1}, denoteN2\{1} = {i1, i2, ..., ik} andN1\{2} = {i1, i2, ..., ik, ik+1, ..., ik+h},
then l j1 − l j2 = 0 for j < {1, 2, ik+1, ..., ik+h} and l j1 − l j2 = −1 for j ∈ {ik+1, ..., ik+h}.
Therefore,
det M(21) − det M(12) =
k+h∑
m=k+1
n∑
j=3
(−1) j+im Qim j,
where
Qim j =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
l33 · · · l3, j−1 l3, j+1 · · · l3n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
lim−1,3 · · · lim−1, j−1 lim−1, j+1 · · · lim−1,n
lim+1,3 · · · lim+1, j−1 lim+1, j+1 · · · lim+1,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
ln3 · · · ln, j−1 ln, j+1 · · · lnn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
It is easy to observe that (−1) j+im Qim j is the ( j − 2, im − 2) entry of the adjugate
matrix of L[3,4,...,n]. From Lemma 2, we know that L[3,4,...,n] is positive definite and
L−1[3,4,...,n] is a nonnegative matrix. Then it follows that the adjugate matrix of L[3,4,...,n]
is an invertible nonnegative matrix. Hence, for all j ∈ {3, 4, ..., n} and m ∈ {k+1, k+
2, ..., k + h}, we have (−1) j+im Qim j ≥ 0 and the inequality holds at least with one
j ∈ {3, 4, ..., n} which implies that det M(21) − det M(12) > 0. Consequently, we can
make a conclusion that u12 < 12 . 
Corollary 1 If Ni = { j}, then ui j ≥ 12 and the equality holds if and only if n = 2.
Proof. Since Ni \ { j} = ∅, the proof is straightforward. 
Theorem 4 For the game G1(GF),
(1) if GF is a circulant graph, then the graph ˜G(ei, e j) is the optimal topology for
every (ei, e j) ∈ S × S ;
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(2) if GF has a vertex ic satisfied Nic = V\{ic}, then ˜G(eic , eic) is the optimal topol-
ogy.
Proof. Firstly, we will prove (1):
If GF is a circulant graph, then the adjacent matrix A is a circulant matrix. It follows
that L is also a circulant matrix. Without loss of generality, we assume that i < j.
Denote ˜Li = L + diag{ei} and ˜L j = L + diag{e j}. Then for a permutation matrix
P =

Ii−1 0 0
0 0 In+1− j
0 I j−i 0

,
we have ˜Li = P ˜L jPT . Notice that P is orthogonal, we obtain that
1Tn ( ˜Li)−1e j = 1Tn P( ˜L j)−1PT e j.
Then it follows from Pe j = ei and 1Tn P = 1Tn that
1Tn ( ˜Li)−1e j = 1Tn ( ˜L j)−1ei.
Hence, form Theorem 1, we get ui j = 12 for all i, j ∈ V , i.e., U = 121n1Tn . Then we
can deduce that the strategy set is S ∗ = S . In another words, the graph ˜G(ei, e j) is
the optimal topology for every (ei, e j) ∈ S × S .
Next, we will give the proof of (2):
For simplicity, we may take ic = n. Owing toNn = {1, 2, ..., n−1}, one hasN j\{n} ⊆
Nn \ { j} for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. Then from Theorem 3, we have un j ≤ 12for all
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. Hence, V(U) = V(U) = 1
2
and en ∈ S ∗. From Property 3 and 4,
it follows that the strategies pair (en, en) is a Nash equilibrium point. Thus, we can
conclude that ˜G(en, en) is the optimal topology. 
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Remark 6 The results of this theorem can give some theoretic explanations for re-
ality. Firstly, the follower’s interaction graph is circulant implies that the influence
power of every follower to the others is equal. Therefore, everyone is the optimal
strategy to both two players. Secondly, if a member has influence on all the others
in a social network, then his influence power is largest. As a result, both two players
will connect with him to minimize their payoff.
From Theorem 4, we can deduce the following results:
Corollary 2 If GF is a star graph with the center vertex ic, then the system has a
unique optimal topology ˜G(eic , eic). Moreover, all followers can achieve consensus,
and the consensus state is y1+y02 .
Corollary 3 If GF is a complete graph, then ˜G(ei, e j) is the optimal topology for
arbitrary (ei, e j) ∈ S × S .
4 Simulation
In this section, we give two numerical simulations to illustrate the effectiveness of
theoretical results in Section 3.
Consider there are 6 followers labeled as 1-6 and two leaders labeled as l0 and l1.
Let the leaders’ initial state be -1 and 1, respectively. Define d0(t) = 16
∑6
i=1 |xi + 1|
and d1(t) = 16
∑6
i=1 |1 − xi| as the average distance function of l0 and l1, respectively.
Obviously, we have limt→∞ d j(t) = U j ( j = 0, 1).
Example 1 Let the followers’ interaction graph GF be a circulant graph depicted
in Fig. 2 (a). Then, it is easy to obtain that the outcome matrix of the game G1(GF)
is U = 12161
T
6 . Therefore we can conclude that all 36 strategies pairs are Nash
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equilibrium points. Consider three strategies pairs (e1, e2), (e1, e3) and (e1, e1). The
corresponded interaction graphs ˜G(e1, e2), ˜G(e1, e3) and ˜G(e1, e1) are described in
Fig. 2 (b), Fig. 2 (c) and Fig. 2 (d), respectively. Fig. 3 shows the followers’ states,
d0(t) and d1(t) under ˜G(e1, e2), ˜G(e1, e3) and ˜G(e1, e1), respectively. Note that under
those three different graphs, both d0(t) and d1(t) which are depicted by dashed lines
in Fig. 3 converge to 1. This result illustrates the effectiveness of theoretical results
in Theorem 4. For ˜G(e1, e1), we can find that all followers converge to the middle
point of two leaders’ initial states, which is consistent with the result of Property 4.
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0l l1 0l l1
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3
45
6
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F
(a)
1 2
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45
6
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~
1 1(d)
Fig. 2. the intercation graph of Example 1
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Fig. 3. the followers’ states and average distance under different strategies pairs
Example 2 The followers’ interaction graph GF is depicted in Fig. 4 (a). It is easy
to find that the follower 1 is a center node in GF. We can obtain the outcome matrix
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Fig. 5. the followers’ states and average distance under different strategies pairs
of the game G1(GF) as following:
U =

0.5 0.3889 0.4455 0.4712 0.4712 0.4455
0.6111 0.5 0.5526 0.5753 0.5753 0.5526
0.5545 0.4474 0.5 0.5273 0.5246 0.5
0.5288 0.4247 0.4727 0.5 0.5 0.4754
0.5288 0.4247 0.4754 0.5 0.5 0.4727
0.5545 0.4474 0.5 0.5246 0.5273 0.5

.
Obviously, u11 = mini max j ui j = min j maxi ui j. Therefore, we can conclude that
˜G(e1, e1) is the optimal topology, which is consistent with the result of Theorem
4. Two strategies pairs (e1, e3) and (e1, e1) and the corresponding graphs ˜G(e1, e3)
and ˜G(e1, e1) are depicted in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), respectively. Fig. 5 shows
the followers’ states, d0(t) and d1(t) under ˜G(e1, e3) and ˜G(e1, e1), respectively. We
can conclude from Fig 5(a) that U0 < U1 for the strategies pair (e1, e3), which
illustrates the effectiveness of theoretical results in Theorem 3.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we make use of game theory to tackle containment control problem
with leaders. Firstly, we assumed that the followers’ interaction subgraph GF was
undirected and connected and every leader can independently select k (≥ 1) follow-
ers to connect with. By choosing his connected followers, each leader attempted
to minimize his payoff which was defined as the average distance from himself to
all followers. Then we proved that the sum of two payoffs is constant. Because ev-
ery strategies pair corresponds to an interaction graph of the system, it was noted
that to find a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to solve the optimal topology of the
system. Intuitively, this is induced by the constant number of followers: if a leader
has more followers then the other leader has fewer followers. The same applies
to the distance between the followers and their leader. Secondly, we redefined this
game as a standard two-player zero-sum game denoted as Gk(GF) and obtained
some properties for it. Thirdly, we further investigated the case of k = 1. For the
game G1(GF), the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be
the optimal topology was given. And if GF was a circulant graph or a graph with
a center node, then the optimal topology was also obtained. This work puts con-
tainment control in a game theoretical framework, this perspective will foster the
understanding of the interactions between leaders. Future work may consider this
game for some MASs with constrains, such as MASs with switching topologies,
MASs under measurement noises and MASs with quantized information transmis-
sion, etc.
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